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Abstract
An empirical incomplete contracts approach is used to analyze optimal integration schemes in a
Minnesota dairy farm supply chain that transfers feed and manure.  The results show that the
forage enterprise is the constraining factor.  The preferred ownership structure is for a forage
producer to own cropping and dairy assets.2
Introduction
The dairy industry in Minnesota is characterized by a large number of relatively small farms,
and is undergoing rapid changes in structure.  Many small Minnesota dairy farms have left the industry
in recent years.  The rate of exodus has thus far exceeded growth in larger farms, causing decreases in
total milk production.  This is of particular significance as the US dairy industry orients itself toward
more milk and dairy product production in California and the West, and processing facilities in the
Upper Midwest face increased competition.  As a strategy to improve its competitiveness, the dairy
industry in Minnesota has encouraged investments in new facilities that can take advantage of size
economies and increase milk volumes available for processing.  Other sectors of agriculture, notably
small grains, have been suggested as potential sources of new investment capital for the dairy industry.
In some key dairy regions, such as West-Central Minnesota, dairy farms are closely interspersed with
farms producing cash grains, predominantly corn and soybeans.
For the most part, dairy farms in Minnesota individually coordinate most of the production
activities involved in producing milk. However, as farms restructure and specialize, a dairy farm supply
chain has emerged with primary forage and small grain production activities as its origin and milk at the
farmgate as its terminus.  This supply chain is still developing; among the issues of interest is the
structure of ownership and integration of the activities in the supply chain and the relation of size
economies to correspondence between activities in the chain.  Two of the key links in this supply chain
are feed production and milking/herd maintenance.
This paper provides an empirical analysis of ownership and organization in a dairy farm supply
chain.  An empirical model of a dairy farm supply chain is developed to determine the limiting activities
and optimal organization.  Based on this model, ownership of activities in the supply chain is3
investigated using an incomplete contracts model.  The results identify the optimal organization and
ownership structure in a Minnesota dairy farm supply chain.
The Incomplete Contracts Approach
The incomplete contracts model evaluates efficient levels of integration between trading
partners (the make-or buy decision); alternatively, it can be thought of as an analytical framework
for mergers and acquisitions. In the model, parties to a transaction are assumed to be boundedly
rational in the sense that not all contingencies can be planned for at the time a contract is written;
some aspects are left open.  The principal determinants of the model are the opportunity costs of
idiosyncratic assets in the trading arrangement.  There are quasi-rents associated with idiosyncratic
assets that can be the subject of opportunism from parties in a trading relationship-this is referred
to as the holdup problem in the industrial organization literature (Williamson, 1985).  The
allocation of residual control rights (ownership) can be used to control the holdup problem;
however, alternative ownership structures can cause incentive (agency) problems.  The incomplete
contracts model evaluates ownership structures based on level of surplus generated.
Conceptual Model
The model presented here is an extended version of the general model developed by Hart
(1995).  There is an upstream firm (a crop producer) and a downstream firm (a dairy producer).
The dairy producer purchases feed ingredients and must dispose of manure.  The crop producer
sells feed ingredients and must obtain fertilizer.  The two parties set about a specialized
relationship in which they exchange feed ingredients and manure.  This relationship is
characterized by boundedly rational agents and goods that are idiosyncratic in nature.  There are
uncertain aspects of the relationship between the crop producer and dairy producer that are
difficult to formalize or anticipate in a contract.  Feed ingredients are available from the central4
spot market; however, market prices may not reflect the value owing to scale economies in the
dairy operation and uncertainty in feed quality and response of cows to feed due to weather.  It is
difficult to make long-term binding commitments to transfer manure, because manure regulations
are liable to change in ways that cannot be anticipated a priori.  Manure is an unpriced good (or
bad), and manure disposal involves transaction costs in establishing agreements to convey manure
and in searching for suitable cropland
3.
There are three time periods.  In the initial period, the crop producer supplements its
complement of small grain production assets by making investments in forage equipment e.  In the
second period, the dairy producer observes the investment by the crop producer and makes
investments in dairy cows and facilities, i
4.  These investments are at least partially idiosyncratic,
owing to location.  In the final period, the conditions underlying the unspecified aspects of the
relationship are revealed, and the parties make trading decisions.  Let the revenue of the dairy
producer be R(i) if it trades with the crop producer.  If the crop producer trades with the dairy
producer, its costs are C(e).  The crop producer produces, and the dairy producer consumes, feed
grains and forages q.  If p is the feed transfer price, then the ex post earnings for the two parties (if
they trade) are
pq(e) – C(q(e)) (1)
R(q(i)) – pq(i)( 2 )
and the total earnings from the joint relationship if they trade in feed (so q(i) = q(e)) are
                                               
3 For example, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency requires detailed nutrient management
plans and aerial photos of land manure is to be applied on; lenders may also require that land for
manure disposal be available long term.
4 The order of moves in the investment “game” derives from the empirical finding in the empirical
analysis that investments by the crop producer are the limiting factor in the system.5
 R(q(i)) – pq(i) + pq(e) – C(q(e)) = R(q(i)) – C(q(e)) (3)
However, due to the presence of uncertainty and quasi-rents, the trading relationship may break
down after the investments have been made.  For example, the dairy producer may act
opportunistically by insisting on renegotiating terms just as the crop producer is harvesting the
crop.  In anticipation of this possibility, agents consider the value of their idiosyncratic investments
in other uses.  The value of specialized assets in the next best use is dependent on the other assets
an agent owns.  For example, even if the crop producer and dairy producer are ultimately unable
to trade in feed, the dairy producer may be able to derive benefits from the crop’s land if it owns
the crop assets that it could not if it did not retain residual control to the crop assets.  In making
investment decisions, the two parties consider their payoffs if the specialized relationship fails and
they are forced to trade on the spot market; the structure of ownership generally affects these
decisions.
Let c(q(e);A) be the cost function of the crop producer if it does not trade with the dairy
producer, given ownership of assets A.   Let r(q(i);A) be the revenue of the dairy producer if it
does not trade with the crop producer. Ownership schedule A
2 means that the crop producer owns
both crop and dairy assets, A
1 means the crop producer owns the crop assets and the dairy
producer owns the dairy assets, and A
0 means the dairy producer owns the dairy assets and the
cropping assets.  Regardless of ownership structure, the operator of the crop enterprise chooses e
and the operator of the dairy enterprise chooses i.  If trade does not occur between the two firms,
the crop producer sells forage and feed grains at price p on the central spot market.  In the6
absence of trade with the crop producer, the dairy producer purchases its feed ingredients from
the central spot market at price p
*5.  Thus, the total surplus if the relationship breaks down is
r(q(i);A) - p
*q(i) + pq(e) - c(q(e);A) (4)
where q(i) = q(e) = q, but q(i) is obtained from the spot market and q(e) is sold to the spot
market.  Due to the idiosyncratic nature of the relationship, the benefit of investment is greatest




1) ≥ c’( dq/de;A
2) > C’( dq/de)( 5 )
 R’( dq/di) > r’( dq/di;A
0) ≥  r’( dq/di;A
1) ≥  r’( dq/di;A
2)
Also, for all e and i and all possible values of A  there are always ex post gains from trade;
R(q(i)) – C(q(e)) > r(q(i);A) - p
*q(i) + pq(e) - c(q(e);A) ≥  0( 6 )
In the final period, all uncertainties are revealed, and the gains from trade are realized.
These gains are allocated through bargaining.  Ex post, the Nash equilibrium bargaining solution is
to split the gains from trade evenly
6.  The ex post payoff is such that each party’s gain under trade
is equal to its gain if the relation breaks down plus its share of the total gains from trade;
π
C = pq(e) - C(q(e)) =  pq(e) - c(q(e);A) + ½ {[R(q(i)) – C(q(e))] – [r(q(i);A) - p
*q(i) + pq(e) -
 c(q(e);A)]}; and
π
D = R(q(i)) – pq(i) =  r(q(i);A) - p
*q(i)  + ½ {[R(q(i)) – C(q(e))] – [r(q(i);A) - p
*q(i) + pq(e) -
 c(q(e);A)]} (7)
                                               
5 If the parties trade on the central spot market, they must pay transportation costs such that p*=
p
o + t and p = p
o - t, where t is the per unit basis and p
o is the spot market price
6 The Nash allocation of any fixed amount is a 50/50 split if both parties must give consent.7
where π  is the ex post payoff, C denotes the crop producer and D denotes the dairy producer.
Each party receives its opportunity cost (r(q(i);A) - p
*q(i), pq(e) - c(q(e);A)) plus its share of the
gains from trade
7.  The gains from trade are disbursed in the ex post transfer price p;
p =  p + [½ {[R(q(i)) – (r(q(i);A) - p
*q(i))] - [ pq(e) - c(q(e);A) - C(q(e))]}]/q (8)
      Equation 7 is a statement of ex post payoffs- investment costs are ignored (because they
are already sunk).  However, investment decisions are made ex ante in which investment costs
matter.  Assume that the cost of dairy investments i is normalized to be just i and that the cost of
forage investments e is e.  Then the relevant objective in choosing investment levels (i,e) is to
maximize payoff net of investment cost;
π
C - e = pq(e) - c(q(e);A) + ½ {[R(q(i)) – C(q(e))] – [r(q(i);A) - p
*q(i) + pq(e) - c(q(e);A)]}- e
π
D - i = r(i;A) - p
*q(i)  + ½ {[R(q(i)) – C(q(e))] – [r(q(i);A) - p
*q(i) + pq(e) - c(q(e);A)]}- i  (9)
Assuming concavity of the system in (8), the equilibrium is the set of first-order conditions
π ’
C = ½ C’(dq/de i = i(e)) +  ½  c’(dq/de  i = i(e); A) -1 = 0
π ’
D = ½ R’(dq/di e) + ½ r’(dq/di e; A) - 1 = 0 (10)
Since equations (10) are interdependent, they must be solved using a backward induction process
applied in two stage games of complete information.  First order conditions (10) differ according




There is also a theoretically optimal level of i and e that a central planner would choose by
cooperatively maximizing ex ante gains from trade R(q(i))-C(q(e))-i-  e.  In general, the crop
producer and dairy producer will individually choose i and e that differ from this optimal level.
                                               
7 Note that if we add the two lines in (7), we obtain
 R(i) - C(e) = r(i;A) - p
*q + pq - c(e;A) + {[R(i) – C(e)] – [r(i;A) - p
*q + pq - c(e;A)]}, or
R(i) - C(e) - [r(i;A) - p
*q + pq - c(e;A)] = {[R(i) – C(e)] – [r(i;A) - p
*q + pq - c(e;A)]}.  In
other words, (7) is an implication of the ex post Nash equilibrium split of the gains from trade.8
However, alternative ownership structures may induce the parties to choose i and e that more
closely approach the theoretical optimum.  The “efficiency” of different ownership structures is
compared using an ex ante surplus function, S(i,e;A);
 S(i**,e**;A
2) = R(q(i**)) - i**- C(q(e**)) - e**
 S(i*,e*;A









The ownership structure that yields the greatest level of surplus in (11) is the preferred choice.
The distribution of this surplus is not important- it can be adjusted with lump sum transfers that do
not affect investment incentives.
Empirical Model
An empirical model of the dairy and crop activities was developed to determine the size
economies and factors constraining the dairy farm supply chain as a whole.  To simplify the
system, the supply chain is constructed such that only the crop producer and dairy producer were
involved.  The crop producer produces feed ingredients and mixes them into feed; the dairy
producer sells milk and calves and purchases all feed and replacement heifers.  Manure can be
transferred from the dairy to the crop operations.
Dairy Operations
The dairy operation is modeled as a mixed integer linear programming problem.  The
problem faced by the dairy producer is to choose a herd size, milking parlor configuration, feed
ration, and number of building sites given limitations on the maximum daily hours of operation of
the parlor, maximum number of production sites, and technology constraints.  The dairy
producer’s objective is to maximize earnings derived from milk and calf sales less annual facilities
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costs, feed costs, labor costs, herd replacement costs, manure disposal costs, and veterinary and
miscellaneous costs.  The model is constrained by technical parameters identifying milking parlor
throughput, freestall, feed storage, manure storage, NRC nutrient requirements, and fixed
constraints of no more than 21 daily hours of operation and 5 production sites.  Integer constraints
were placed on herd size, number of calves sold, the number of parlors of a given configuration,
and the number of production sites.  The key parameters of the model are identified in Table 1.
Up to 3000 tons of dairy ration and soymeal can be purchased by the dairy.  Milk revenues are
based on 2000 cwt/cow/year and a price of $13.81/cwt.  Facilities costs are the annuity value of
the initial investment at a 9% interest rate.
Crop Operations
The crop investment problem is also conceived as a mixed integer linear programming
problem.  The crop producer chooses feed ingredients to produce, acreage to rent, and levels of
investment in forage equipment.  The model is constrained by the technology and integer
constraints and by the number of skilled and unskilled workers available; one skilled worker and
two unskilled workers are assumed
8.  The crop producer already has in place in equipment suitable
for tillage, seeding, crop maintenance, and harvesting of grain crops; these services are valued at
per-acre costs estimated by Lazarus (1998).  Investments in forage equipment are broken into
fixed (ownership) costs and variable costs.  Fixed costs are taken as the annuity value purchase
prices for machines at 9% over their useful life; fixed costs are measured in units of machines
owned and constrained to be an integer.  Variable costs are associated with fixed costs based on
estimates of maximum acres per year for each machine (Table 1); variable costs generally decrease
                                               
8 Following Lazarus (1998), only skilled workers can operate a forage harvester; skilled workers
can also operate the same equipment as unskilled workers.10
as machine capacity increases.  Regardless of whether the dairy and crop trade, the crop producer
can sell up to 1000 acres of cash crop corn and 1000 acres of cash crop soybeans.  Feeds that are
transferred to the dairy are ground and mixed by the crop producer at a cost of $8/ton.
Manure Disposal
Manure is stored in an earthen facility by the dairy producer for 365 days.  It is applied on
cropland based on the uptake of nutrient by corn, alfalfa, and soybeans and whether it is broadcast
or incorporated
9.    There are transaction costs associated with securing land for manure disposal
of an assumed $15/acre/year.  The dairy producer bears the application cost; custom manure
application rates assuming 2 miles transportation estimated by Lorimor (1998) for Iowa are used.
Ownership Scenarios
There are 3 ownership possibilities: Ownership of all assets by the crop producer (A
2), ownership
of all assets by the dairy producer (A
0), or ownership of crop assets by the crop producer and
ownership of dairy assets by the dairy producer (A
1).  In each case, feed is transferred at cost with
the transfer price determined ex post; if trade does not occur, each party pays a basis of $7.27/ton
extrapolated from a survey by Lazarus (1999).  Under A
2, the crop producer retains right of first
refusal to the dairy’s manure.  There are no transaction costs if manure is applied to the crop
producer’s land, and additional land can be obtained to dispose of manure subject to transaction
costs.  Under A
0, the dairy retains residual claim to cropland for the purposes of manure disposal.
No transaction costs are required in applying manure to the crop producer’s land, but the dairy
enterprise scales its operations in expectation of utilizing solely this acreage so no additional land
is accessed for manure disposal.  Under A
1, all manure applications entail transactions costs
                                               
9 Nitrogen uptake rates: Corn 48 lbs/ac, Soybeans 220 lbs/ac, Alfalfa 100 lbs/ac.  If manure is
broadcast, approximately 15% of the nitrogen is lost to the atmosphere; if it is injected 2% is lost.11
because the crop producer does not have residual rights to the manure and the dairy producer
does not have residual rights to the cropland.
Empirical Analysis of Ownership Structure
As a base run against which to interpret the incomplete contract results, the central
planner’s problem was solved by choosing investment levels cooperatively under the imposition
that trade will occur between dairy and crop.  The results are presented in Table 1.  The crop
producer supplies corn silage, hay, and corn to the dairy producer.  The factor limiting the scale of
trade is the forage enterprise, specifically the capacity to cut hay.  The dairy producer constructs 2
sites with 36 stall milking parlors.  A total of 5174 acres are required to incorporate manure,
requiring an additional 826 acres to be secured.
In analyzing alternative ownership structures, alternative forms of the mixed integer linear
program embodying Equation (9) are solved.  The objective function is thus a combination of
earnings under trade and under no-trade.  Because it is a two-stage game of complete information,
an iterative solution procedure is used.  Feasible combinations of investments are isolated from the
crop producer’s problem.  These are iteratively substituted in the dairy producer’s problem.  The
dairy investment level that maximizes the dairy producer’s payoff given any feasible crop
investment is the dairy producer’s best response; combined with the corresponding crop
investment this defines the equilibrium
10.  Table 1 summarizes the results of this procedure, where
“crop own” is A
2, “contract” is A
1, and “dairy own” is A
0.  The criterion function (11) is given by
the central planner’s payoffs in Table 1.  Based on this specification of ownership scenarios,
ownership of dairy and crop assets by the crop producer is optimal.  Both A
2 and A
1 result in the
                                               
10 Reaction functions are “substituted” in alternative payoffs functions by fixing their value with
equality constraints12
same allocation of manure nutrients and other resources; the difference in payoffs comes from a
lower cost of transferring manure under A
2 relative to A
1.  Although the investment levels are
identical, solutions under A
2 and A
1 differ from the central planner’s result due to differences in
the allocation of hay cutting capacity.  Under the cooperative solution, scarce hay cutting capacity
is allocated away from haylage in favor of hay production.  Only A
0 resulted in a significant
alteration in investments due to a reduced herd size.  Strict dependence of the dairy on owned
crop assets to dispose of manure results in a smaller dairy herd, underutilized milking center
facilities, and a misallocation of manure nutrients relative to the central planner’s result.  The
transfer prices of feeds in all three scenarios are remarkably stable.  In all cases, the transfer price
is between the central spot market price and the spot market price delivered to the dairy.
VI  Conclusions
This paper derives and illustrates the use of an incomplete contracts model to study
integration in a dairy farm supply chain given technology and specification of objectives under
alternative ownership schemes.  The key determinants are the cost and productivity of dairy and
crop investments and transaction costs in manure disposal.  The results show that feed production
is the limiting factor in the dairy farm supply chain. The ownership structure that generates the
largest surplus is ownership of dairy and crop assets by the crop producer.  This suggests that a
source of future expansion in the West-Central Minnesota dairy industry may be the cash crop
sector.  Accurate estimates of manure transaction costs and improved information on cost and
capacity of forage equipment will improve future research in dairy farm supply chain integration.13
















Dairy ($) 401/cow 1643.20
per stall
6224 34,013 36,327 687
Base Run 1,411,566 352,420 1,0591,047 2462 hd Two
2X18
00 1 3
Crop Own 1,381,527 314,959 1,066,568 2462 hd 2 2X18 0 0 1 3
Contract 1,325,260 323,508 1,001,753 2462 hd 2 2X18 0 0 1 3
























Price ($/yr) 3841 4489 13,443 3216 5160 16,706 45/ac 159/tn 159/tn
Base Run 0 0 1 0 0 3 4321 ac 1213 tn 3000 tn
Crop Own 0 0 1 0 0 3 4321 ac 934 tn 3000 tn
Contract 0 0 1 0 0 3 4321 ac 934 tn 3000 tn





Corn Silage Hay Haylage Corn Fed Hay
Sold
Soy Fed Soy Sold






Transfer P p($/tn) q(tn) p($/tn) q(tn) p($/tn) qp ($/tn) q(tn)
Base Run 5147 ac 0 - 8001 - 6744 - 0 - 3575 0 0 1170 tn
Crop Own 5147 ac 0 24.17 8001 86.07 5086 36.96 4580 85.07 3575 0 0 1170 tn
Contract 5147 ac 0 24.17 8001 86.07 5086 36.96 4580 85.07 3575 0 0 1170 tn
Dairy Own 10 ac
* 4311 ac
* 24.19 8001 86.09 4835 36.98 4580  85.08 3575 251 tn 0 1170 tn
*Estimate
**Central spot market prices; corn silage valued at 10 x shelled corn price, haylage value moisture adjusted from hay price14
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